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This General Commentary extends
the excellent article by Speelman and
McGann (2013) criticizing how psychol-
ogy researchers often use group means
when interpreting psychology research. I
believe that the identified problems mat-
ter, and are part of a more general problem
in psychology; the criticisms apply to more
than just means.
To commence, consider a group mean.
The mean might not reflect the score
of any particular individual. Or consider
two group means; e.g., that the mean for
males exceeds the mean for females on
some characteristic. This difference does
not necessarily imply that the majority
of males exceed the majority of females
on that characteristic. Nevertheless, as
Speelman and McGann noted, psychology
researchers tend to draw this last type of
conclusion.
The problem is part of a more gen-
eral multilevel problem in psychology that
can be seen easily if we make salient that
researchers compute group means to sup-
port a causal hypothesis, as follows. “My
hypothesis is that X causes Y, so I will
manipulate X, and get an effect on Y, such
that X1 gives a value of Y1 and X2 gives a
value of Y2. If the means of Y1 and Y2 dif-
fer, the field will accept that a change in X
causes a change in Y.” And at one level, this
is perfectly reasonable. At another level, it
is not. It depends on whether we are inter-
ested in causation at the group or individ-
ual level. If we are interested in causation
at the group level, obtaining differences
between group means is reasonable. But if
the causal hypothesis is at the individual
level, obtaining differences between group
means might be fine as a start, but it is not
a reasonable basis for a strong conclusion.
Consider, for example, the old-
fashioned notion that attitudes toward
performing behaviors cause people to have
corresponding behavioral intentions (e.g.,
Fishbein and Ajzen, 1975). Theoretically,
this hypothesis is at the individual level
in the sense that manipulating any partic-
ular person’s attitude is alleged to cause
that person’s behavioral intention to shift
accordingly. But practically all of the per-
formed research has been at the group
level (see Fishbein and Ajzen, 2010 for a
review). That is, mean behavioral inten-
tions in either a pro or anti attitude group
differ, or attitudes and behavioral inten-
tions are correlated across a sample of
individuals. After thousands of studies,
there is support that attitudes cause behav-
ioral intentions at the group level but it is
not clear that this is so at the individual
level. The empirical fact of a difference
in the group means, or an overall cor-
relation after statistically “controlling”
for alternative explanations, fails to show
that changing any particular person’s atti-
tude would cause that person’s behavioral
intention to change.
Suppose that an infallible Demon
knows that for a given behavior and pop-
ulation of interest, attitudes cause behav-
ioral intentions for 3% and that attitudes
have nothing to do with behavioral inten-
tions for the other 97%. Further suppose
that a researcher performed an experi-
ment with a large sample, using a power-
ful manipulation of attitudes, and found
that the means differed significantly in the
predicted direction. This would be inter-
preted as “strong support” that attitudes
cause behavioral intentions even though
the Demon knows that the hypothesis is
wrong for 97% of the people to whom it
is intended to apply! In this case, the effect
is observed because of the power achieved
by the large sample, and the effect on 3%
gives an overall impression of an effect in
the whole sample.
A within-participants design would not
necessarily mitigate the problem. Suppose
that a researcher measured behavioral
intentions before and after manipulating
participants’ attitudes. The usual analy-
sis would be to compare before vs. after
means, this difference would be statis-
tically significant provided a sufficiently
large sample size, and so the natural
conclusion would again be that atti-
tudes cause behavioral intentions. In fact,
the researcher might tout the use of
a within-participants design as provid-
ing strong support for causation at the
level of individual persons! For the use
of a within-participants design to miti-
gate the multilevel problem, the researcher
would have to perform frequency anal-
yses, as Speelman and McGann (2013)
recommended, and is rarely done. It is
only in the event that frequency analy-
ses were performed that the conclusion
might approach that of our knowledgeable
Demon.
The problem is not just with means.
Most of the recent research connecting
attitudes with behavioral intentions has
been with path analyses and structural
equation analyses. But changing the type
of “causal” statistics does not address
the multilevel problem, which is that the
causal hypothesis is within-participants
at the theoretical level, and between-
participants at the empirical level, and the
two do not correspond. Even if we ignore
the usual problems with correlations, and
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assume that the causal analyses really do
indicate causation, it is the wrong kind of
causation; the fact of group level causation
fails to imply corresponding individual
level causation.
In conclusion, I agree with Speelman
and McGann (2013) that although means
can be useful, researchers tend to draw
stronger conclusions from them than
those that are warranted. In addition, I
have attempted to demonstrate here that
this is not just a problem of means,
but is part of a more general failure for
psychologists to recognize the difference
between causation at the group level vs.
at the individual level. It is possible for
hypotheses to be correct at the group
level and incorrect for the vast major-
ity of individual people. Speelman and
McGann complained that although their
colleagues say that the problems with
means are well known, they continue to
commit them. I believe that the prob-
lem is a more general one of confusing
causation at the group vs. individual lev-
els. Until researchers learn to routinely
distinguish between levels of causation,
they will continue to make the errors that
Speelman and McGann documented, as
well as many additional ones. My hope is
that the present General Commentary will
provide an impetus in the direction of rec-
ognizing the importance of the multilevel
distinction.
REFERENCES
Fishbein, M., and Ajzen, I. (1975). Belief, Attitude,
Intention and Behavior: an Introduction to Theory
and Research. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
Fishbein, M., and Ajzen, I. (2010). Predicting and
Changing Behavior: the Reasoned Action Approach.
New York, NY: Psychology Press (Taylor and
Francis).
Speelman, C. P., and McGann, M. (2013). How
mean is the mean? Front. Psychol. 4:451. doi:
10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00451
Received: 30 November 2013; accepted: 14 February
2014; published online: 27 February 2014.
Citation: Trafimow D (2014) The mean as a multi-
level issue. Front. Psychol. 5:180. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.
2014.00180
This article was submitted to Quantitative Psychology
and Measurement, a section of the journal Frontiers in
Psychology.
Copyright © 2014 Trafimow. This is an open-access
article distributed under the terms of the Creative
Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The use, dis-
tribution or reproduction in other forums is permit-
ted, provided the original author(s) or licensor are
credited and that the original publication in this
journal is cited, in accordance with accepted aca-
demic practice. No use, distribution or reproduc-
tion is permitted which does not comply with these
terms.
Frontiers in Psychology | Quantitative Psychology and Measurement February 2014 | Volume 5 | Article 180 | 2
